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Time allocation and performance: the case of Chinese entrepreneurs 
 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the effect of time allocation on the financial performance of 
entrepreneurial firms. We apply the Lewbel (2012) estimator to a pooled dataset of Chinese 
private manufacturing firms that are managed by their owners. Time is allocated between 
management, networking and study activities. After accounting for endogeneity, we find an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between management hours and firm performance and 
between networking and firm performance. However, no relationship between time spent 
studying and firm performance is observed. We also find that the managing 
hours-performance relationship is particularly strong for companies managed by 
entrepreneurs who own more than 75% of share, for companies that are managed by owners 
with previous experience, for male entrepreneurs and for smaller sized firms. 
Key words 
Time allocation, owner manager businesses, China  
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1. Introduction 
 
This study examines the effect of time allocation on the performance of Chinese 
owner-controlled manufacturing firms. We investigate a research question which is 
fundamental to the success of small business owners, namely: what is the best way to allocate 
the scarce resource of time? Time allocation is particularly important for entrepreneurs 
because their working hours are fragmented into a wide range of activities, (Florén 2006). For 
example, O’Gorman et al. (2005) argue that, over a day, small firm CEOs performed on 
average, 35 activities. In addition, they had to deal with a range of people including 
subordinates, suppliers and customers. Florén and Tell (2012) suggest that managers in fast 
growing firms spend about 40% more undisturbed time on other work than on the daily 
operational work of the firm. Verheul et al. (2009) find that individuals will work fewer hours 
if they have other income available and that the productivity of time is positively related to 
relevant experience. Therefore, the optimal allocation of time between different activities 
represents a crucial part of the decisions made by an entrepreneur.  
We address the time allocation problem by analyzing how financial performance is affected 
by the allocation of time among three different activities, namely managing, networking and 
studying. In contrast to other specifications that employ a positive monotonic 
time-allocation-performance relationship (e.g., Ang et al. 2000; Bitler et al. 2005), we propose 
that there is inverted U-shaped relationship between hours allocated to different activities and 
firm performance. The increasing opportunity costs associated with additional hours leads to 
diminishing performance returns. This suggests that too many hours allocated to a specific 
activity, for example investment in social capital, may harm performance because too little 
time is being spent on other important activities such as managing the company or investing 
in in human capital. 
 
The Chinese environment is well-suited to our empirical investigation for two main reasons. 
First, the development of the Chinese economy, with its expansion in entrepreneurial activity, 
provides an interesting framework within which to analyse the importance of time allocation. 
Even though private enterprises were not formally permitted until 1988, nowadays we 
observe the rapid growth and importance of Chinese SMEs (Anderson et al. 2003). For 
example, in 2011 they accounted for about 55% of the growth of gross domestic product and 
70% of all employment (NBSC 2013). Second, the success of private enterprise development 
in China can be partly explained by its cultural values (Robb 2002). Persistent hard work 
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is regarded as a significant characteristic of Chinese entrepreneurs who are more likely to 
stress a strong work ethic (Morris and Schindehutte 2005).  
The study contributes to the empirical literature in two important ways. First, it contributes to 
the entrepreneurship literature by exploring the impact of the time allocation behaviour of 
Chinese entrepreneurs on firm performance. The analysis of three activities, namely 
managing, networking and studying, provides deeper insights into how these activities affect 
the performance of entrepreneurial ventures. Second, the empirical analysis is based on the 
theoretical underpinnings of opportunity costs whereby, beyond a certain point, allocating 
additional hours to one activity rather than to another has an adverse effect on performance. 
Given that time is a constrained resource, we propose an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between managerial activities and the performance of entrepreneurial ventures. We also 
develop the analysis by linking the opportunity cost model to social and human capital 
theories in relation to networking hours and study hours respectively. These links are explored 
by employing the Lewbel (2012) estimator which addresses endogeneity issues.  
Our analysis is based on two extensive nationwide surveys of Chinese private 
owner-controlled manufacturing enterprises across 31 provinces in 2004 and 2006. As 
hypothesised, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between performance and 
management hours and between performance and networking hours. The optimal time spent 
on management activities is 6.8 hours per day (or about 34 hours per 5-days week) and on 
networking it is 4.9 hours per day (or about 24.3 hours per 5-days week). This evidence 
suggests that there are optimal time allocations for each of these activities and that beyond a 
certain number of hours, additional hours appear to harm firm performance. We also report 
qualitatively similar results for firms that have male owners. A quadratic relationship with 
management hours is also found in smaller firms, in firms with high ownership shareholdings 
and in firms with more experienced managers. . However, we find no relationship between 
study hours and firm performance in either the whole sample or in any of the subsamples 
analysed. 
The paper therefore provides support for a number of theoretical explanations of the time 
allocation-performance relationship. We find support for the typical labour-leisure trade-off 
theories. Excessive time spent on certain activities will have a detrimental impact on firm 
performance. However, the performance-effort sensitivity may be reduced by agency costs. 
Furthermore, initial social and human capital, measured by previous managerial experience, 
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enhances the effect of management effort on performance. Finally, our analysis of the 
importance of human capital investment produces insignificant outcomes suggesting that a 
longer time period and specific programs of education may be required to observe any 
benefits from the investment. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of relevant 
literature and discusses the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy. 
Section 4 describes the data and initial analysis. Section 5 reports the results and Section 6 
presents the conclusions.  
2. Theory, literature and hypotheses development 
This section provides the theoretical context within which the effects of time allocation on 
firm performance are analysed. Time is an important concept in economics because it is a 
scarce resource. Becker (1965) presents a theory of the allocation of time between different 
activities. The concept of time allocation between different activities has been extended to 
analyse a number of situations including, the factors affecting the allocation of time devoted 
to a new venture whilst remaining employed (Burmeister-Lamp et al. 2012). Others have 
analysed the self-employment or employment decision (Levesque et al. 2002). In addition, 
there are a number of studies that have proposed a non-linear relationship between hours 
worked and factors such as taxation and welfare benefits (Chetty 2012), budget constraints 
(Beffy et al. 2014), and restrictions on the number of hours that can be worked (Ham and 
Reilly 2002). 
There is also a strand of literature that analysed the hours allocation issue in relation to 
business. An entrepreneur’s limited time has to be allocated among a number of activities, 
(O’Gorman et al. 2005). In this paper we define time allocation in terms of the share of each 
day spent on the following activities: management, networking and studying. Furthermore, 
the effects of all these activities on firm performance may differ with respect to institutional 
setup, for example, agency issues or in terms of the size of firms and entrepreneurs’ personal 
characteristics such as previous managerial experience and gender. 
A typical entrepreneurial model (e.g. Holmström and Tirole 1997) assumes a positive, 
monotonic relationship between effort and performance. In this setup, greater effort increases 
profit. There is evidence that increased hours spent on managing will generate benefits for the 
company in the form of improved performance. Bitler et al. (2005) define effort in terms of 
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hours worked and report that this has a positive effect on firm performance. Abernethy et al. 
(2013) examine the association between different types of performance measure and the time 
horizon of business unit managers that have profit responsibilities. They report that managers 
spend most time on short-term horizon activities and least time on long-term horizon 
activities. However, they also find that financial and non-financial performance is positively 
associated with management taking account of longer time horizons. Bandiera et al. (2011) 
find that, for Italian CEOs, time spent with insiders is positively related to firm performance 
whereas time spent with outsiders is not. Bandiera et al. (2013) also find a positive 
relationship between the number of hours worked by Indian CEOs and firm performance. 
There is also limited evidence about the non-linear nature of the hours-performance 
relationship. Bitler et al. (2005) propose a Cobb-Douglas relationship which yields a positive 
relationship between hours and performance. Bandiera et al. (2011 and 2013) assume a 
linear-log function and report a positive relationship. This implies that increasing hours 
associated with any activity improves performance. However, consistent with increasing 
opportunity costs and diminishing marginal returns to hours allocated, we propose an inverted 
U-shaped relationship between activity hours and financial performance. We develop a 
theoretical model below to support this proposition.  
2.1 Theoretical Model Framework  
To underpin our econometric specification, we develop a simple theoretical framework. We 
assume that an entrepreneur has a C1 utility function U(E) equal to venture profit π(E) minus 
opportunity costs c(E). For simplicity, the profit function is assumed to be π(E) = AEα, 
where A is the exogenously defined level of an entrepreneur's ability and α  is return on 
effort, 1 > α > 0 . Opportunity costs are parametrized as the linear function of effort 
(E), c(E) = ηE: 
𝑈(𝐸) = 𝜋(𝐸) − 𝑐(𝐸) = 𝐴𝐸𝛼 − 𝜂𝐸 
0 ≤ 𝐸 
𝐸 ≤ ?̅? 
Effort is constrained not to exceed the exogenous value E̅ > 0  which corresponds to 
maximum number of hours that an entrepreneur could work (E ≤ E̅) and non-negativity 
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constraint (0 ≤ E). The internal solution for this setup is: 
E∗ = (
Aα
η
)
1
1−α
 
U(E∗) = (
Aα
η
)
1
1−α
((A)
1
1−α (
α
η
)
α
1−α
− η) 
The optimal level of effort is a positive relationship with returns to effort ( α)  and 
entrepreneurs ability (A), and a negative relationship with the opportunity costs of effort (η). 
In this case, we would not expect that the relationship between effort and performance to be 
monotonic, as assumed by a typical agency model. This outcome is consistent with the 
hypotheses set out below. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
The model therefore shows that it is neither optimal not to work (labour supply is zero) nor to 
work maximum hours. Diminishing marginal returns to entrepreneurial effort will eventually 
set in because of the increasing opportunity costs associated with working beyond the optimal 
time allocation.  
Thus, beyond a certain number of hours, an increase in hours spent on management activities 
means that too little time will be available for other work activities, such as developing social 
and business contacts. This ultimately damages the ability of the business to develop and 
grow and will thus harm performance. We therefore hypothesize that, up to a point, increasing 
the hours allocated to work activities is likely to generate increasing returns but that negative 
marginal returns to the additional hours spent on a specific activity will occur beyond a 
certain time allocation. This enables us to estimate the optimal time allocation between these 
activities and to indicate maximum hours per activity. Therefore, in relation to management 
hours: 
H1: We expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between hours spent on management tasks 
and financial performance 
It has been argued that the success of business ventures is determined not only by 
entrepreneurial effort but also by financial and social capital (Bosma et al. 2004). Given that 
social capital can be regarded as an asset to an entrepreneur, our second hypothesis deals with 
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networking and the effect that increasing social capital has on firm performance. A successful 
manager needs not only to manage the internal operations of the firm, but has also to establish 
external networks and contacts. Social capital may be defined as a means of capturing the 
relationship between actions and outcomes associated with the interactions between groups 
(Adler and Kwon 2002). They differentiate between bridging social capital, external 
relationships, and bonding social capital, internal relationships. It is the former that is the 
focus of this paper and in particular the effect of investing in social capital defined in terms of 
networking by means such as making business contacts, attending seminars/conferences, 
undertaking public relations and hospitality activities and how this affects firm performance.   
In relation to the returns to social capital, Bosma et al. (2004) argue that small businesses 
need to have stronger ties with for example, clients, investors, debtors, and subcontractors, 
and that therefore the expected benefits relating to social capital are high. They find that 
investment in social and human capital enhances entrepreneurial performance.1 Fafchamps 
and Minten (2002) report a positive relationship between social connections and financial 
performance. Davidsson and Honig (2003) find that social capital has a positive effect on the 
performance of Swedish entrepreneurial firms. Lee and Tsang (2001) report a positive 
relationship between networking and performance for Chinese entrepreneurs in small and 
medium sized firms in Singapore. Cao et al. (2014) also find that social capital has a positive 
effect on the performance of Chinese firms.  
 
Networking is of particular importance to Chinese firms because the guanxi (a form of social 
networking and relationship building) possessed by entrepreneurs is a critical success factor. 
State owned enterprises are able to avoid substantial bureaucratic costs and also have better 
access to resources in in the Chinese economy (Chen et al. 2015), and therefore guanxi is 
essential for private businesses to obtain resources and to navigate bureaucratic structures 
(Talavera et al. 2012). Managers’ guanxi networks may benefit their organizational growth 
through providing information flows, institutional advantages and necessary resources (Sheng 
et al. 2011).  
 
However, an alternative view is that the time spent with outsiders may mostly benefit the 
individual manager without contributing to firm’s performance given that the interests of 
managers and firms may be misaligned (Malmendier and Tate 2009). Too much time spent on 
networking will therefore encroach on the time available for managerial activities. Thus, for 
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example, Bandiera et al. (2011 and 2013) find that hours spent networking may benefit the 
manager rather than the firm. However, they analysed the time allocations of CEOs whereas 
this paper analyses the time allocation of owner managers. Therefore, the appropriate 
consideration here is that too much time spent networking may prevent time being allocated 
to deal with strategic and operational business issues rather than time being allocated to 
benefit the individual manager. This is consistent with our second hypothesis that, beyond a 
certain time allocation, increasing opportunity costs are incurred as additional hours are spent 
networking:  
 
H2: We expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between hours spent on networking and 
financial performance 
Human capital may be defined as the skills and knowledge acquired through schooling, 
on-the-job training and experience (Becker 1975). Human capital theory therefore implies a 
positive monotonic relationship between human capital and performance (Florin et al. 2003). 
In the case of entrepreneurs, the greater the human capital, the better able that person is to 
exploit profitable opportunities. Cassar (2006) argue that entrepreneurs with greater human 
capital will be more successful than entrepreneurs with less human capital because they seek 
to earn a higher return on their human capital investment.   
However, Davidsson and Honig (2003) argue that this is not necessarily always the case. For 
example, excessive human capital might affect risk-taking behaviour and decisions to invest. 
They find no evidence that human capital factors affect the performance of nascent 
entrepreneurial firms. Further, the effects of different components of human capital vary. 
Unger et al. (2011) suggest that performance is more likely to be affected by the outcomes of 
human capital investment (knowledge or skills) than by the human capital investments 
themselves (education or years of experience).  
In addition, the effects of formal education may differ relative to the investment in specific 
human capital. For example, Volery et al. (2013) find that entrepreneurial education has a 
positive, but limited effect on human capital. Similarly, Dickson et al. (2008) suggest that the 
effect of general education is not clear but they do find a positive link between specific 
programs of entrepreneurship education and subsequent entrepreneurial success. Finally, the 
education–performance sensitivity might be different with respect to the stages of business 
development or industry characteristics.  
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We investigate the impact of the investment in human capital, as measured by the number of 
hours spent studying, has on firm performance. The impact of time spent on studying on the 
business success of an entrepreneur is difficult to predict theoretically. On the one hand, it 
may be argued that entrepreneurs that spend more time studying have a stronger commitment 
to running their businesses and thus the coefficient for time spent on studying is expected to 
be positive. This is because hours spent on studying will increase a manager’s stock of human 
capital and will also benefit the company via an improved ability to deal with business issues. 
On the other hand, it could be argued that entrepreneurs that spent more time studying will 
have higher opportunity costs associated with spending less time on other activities such as 
managerial functions. There are empirical studies (e.g., Lynskey 2004 and Ganotakis 2012) 
that suggest an inverted U-shaped relationship between human capital and firm performance. 
Consistent with this, we hypothesise:  
H3: We expect an inverted U-shaped relationship between hours spent studying and financial 
performance 
The links between activities and performance may change depending on the organizational 
imperfections within entrepreneurial ventures or the personal characteristics of business 
owners. We develop the analysis by looking at two subsamples: the first deals with potential 
agency issues associated with ownership; the second with the importance of previous 
managerial experience.  
First, we analyse potential agency issues by examining the effect of ownership stakes on the 
hours–performance relationship. The separation of ownership and control has long been 
recognised as a source of potential conflict between management and shareholders in the 
context of publicly owned firms (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The misalignment of interests 
results in agency costs being borne by the owners. However, managerial ownership will 
reduce the incentive to consume perquisites or to undertake sub-optimal decisions. These 
costs diminish as manager shareholdings increase hence leading to a convergence of interests. 
However, increased managerial ownership may also lead to entrenchment (Fama and Jensen, 
1983), as managers become insulated from effective monitoring. There have been many 
studies that have analysed the effect of management ownership of the performance of publicly 
quoted companies, for example, Von Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) for the US, 
McKnight and Weir (2009) for the UK, Rose (2005) for Denmark and Andres (2008) for 
Germany.   
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However, unlike quoted companies, small businesses offer a direct test of the zero agency 
cost model because they will yield cases of 100% ownership. This implies that firms that have 
managerial ownership of less than 100% will incur agency costs and that these costs will 
increase as managerial ownership declines. Consistent with the agency model, Ang et al. 
(2000) found that agency costs increased as management shareholding decreased. Bitler et al. 
(2005) find that, after controlling for endogeneity, there is a positive relationship between 
ownership, hours worked and performance for privately owned firms. Their finding is 
consistent with the agency model because it suggests that the incentives provided by increased 
ownership result in better firm performance and outweigh any potential entrenchment effects. 
Their model uses a logarithmic specification which shows positive, but diminishing, returns to 
hours worked. The positive result is consistent with the agency incentive argument. Therefore, 
we expect that the incentive effects associated with high managerial ownership will result in a 
more efficient allocation of time between managerial activities and improve firm 
performance.  
H4: The time allocation–performance relationship is stronger as managerial ownership 
increases.  
The second sample split analyses the impact of management experience on the 
hours-performance relationship. As discussed above, entrepreneurial effort as well as social 
and human capital may have a differentiated impact during different stages of firm 
development. Although the pooled nature of the data does not allow us to directly analyse the 
influence of time, we aim to incorporate a temporal element to the analysis by using previous 
managerial experience. This represents an accumulation of knowledge, skills and experience 
that have been gained over time. A number of studies (e.g. Ehrenberg and Smith 2000) 
suggest that there is a positive but non-linear relationship between job experience and 
performance. However, Sturman (2003) finds an inverted U-shaped relationship between time 
and performance when jobs have low complexity. We therefore hypothesis that:  
H5: The time allocation–performance relationship is enhanced by previous management 
experience  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Econometric specification 
12 
 
Based on our hypotheses, we develop our baseline regression for investigating the 
relationship between the time allocation of managers and the performance of their companies,  
Firm Performancei = α + β Hoursik + δ Hours2ik + Ziγ + ui  (1) 
Where i is the firm, and ui is the error term. 
Firm Performancei, is an indicator of operating performance. Consistent with Robb and 
Watson (2012) we use return on assets (ROA) defined as profit after tax normalised by total 
assets. 
Our key explanatory variable, Hoursik, is a self-reported measure of time spent on each of 
three activities, k ⊂ { 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝑆𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 }. Respondents were asked how 
many hours each day they spent on the following activities: managing, networking, and 
studying. In the analysis we report the share of hours spent on each activity (hours divided by 
24).2  
Vector Zi includes a number of control variables that account for firm and manager 
characteristics. To control for firm size, we use the logarithm of total sales.3 Log(firm age) is 
the natural log of firm age in years. Entrepreneurial characteristics are also expected to be 
important in the relationship between time allocation and firm performance. Age is the age of 
the entrepreneur in years; Female is a dummy variable that is 1 if the entrepreneur is female 
and 0 if male; Single is a dummy variable that is 1 if the manager is a single decision maker 
and 0 if not; Education is 1 if entrepreneur has university education and 0 if not. Ownership is 
the share (%) of the firm owned by the entrepreneur. Management experience is a dummy 
variable that is 1 if the entrepreneur has any managerial experience before, and 0 if not. 
Finally, we include industry, region and year dummy variables.  
Although we use data from two consecutive waves of the Chinese Enterprise Survey, we 
cannot make use of panel data techniques because there are no means of tracking the same 
firms over both waves. We, therefore, use pooled data analysis. The hours-performance 
relationship may be simultaneous. For example, Verheul et al. (2009) run regressions with 
both hours and profit as dependent variables and estimate them by using the same 
independent variables. To address the two-way relationship between hours and performance 
we utilise an instrumental variable (IV) approach. The traditional IV approach depends on the 
validity of the instruments however finding a suitable instrument set is not a trivial exercise. 
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To address this issue, we make use of the approach of Lewbel (2012) which generates a set of 
internal instruments. 
The Lewbel (2012) procedure consists of two stages. Let us assume that we have 𝜑1 … 𝜑𝑛 
endogenous variables and 𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑘 exogenous variables. In the first stage we run n OLS 
regressions with the endogenous variables, 𝜙𝑖  as the dependent variables and the exogenous 
variables 𝑥1 … 𝑥𝑘 as independent variables. After this step we generate predicted residuals 
(𝑢1 … 𝑢𝑛). Then we use these residuals to construct an instrument vector 𝑧1 … 𝑧𝑛 for each 
𝑖 ∈ 1. . 𝑛,  we estimate 𝑧𝑖 = (𝜑𝑖 − 𝜑?̅?)𝑢𝑖 , where 𝜑?̅?  is the mean of 𝜑𝑖 . Note that this 
approach is valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity in the first stage, as has been proved by 
the Breusch-Pagan (1979) test. In the second stage we run two-step IV-GMM by treating time 
allocation as endogenous and instrument it with the internally generated regressors.  
In addition to the internally generated instruments discussed above, we also create a vector of 
externally selected instruments that are likely to affect time allocation but not performance. 
The instruments include variables related to management team characteristics and the 
entrepreneur's household and family, namely the natural logarithm of household expenditure, 
the natural logarithm of entrepreneur's family size, the share of personal income in total 
household income, and the natural logarithm of management team size. None of these 
measures are directly linked with the performance of entrepreneurial ventures, but are likely 
to affect the time allocation of business owners. For example, larger families and higher 
household expenditures may increase the motivation of entrepreneurs to work longer hours, 
whereas if the entrepreneur makes a small contribution to the family budget, this may have a 
negative effect on hours worked. Increased team size will increase effort because the 
entrepreneur will have to spend more time monitoring the activities of the team.  
The validity of our estimation depends on two important characteristics. First, there should be 
a zero correlation between the instruments and the error term. To test this assumption we 
make use of the Sargan/Hansen overidentification test. Second, there should be a strong 
correlation between the instruments selected and the instrumented variables. We test this 
proposition by Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic which is also known as underidentification test.  
4. Sample and data analysis 
Our sample consists of manufacturing firm-level data taken from a nationwide sample 
survey of privately owned Chinese enterprises. The survey gathers information on a sample 
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of registered businesses in the private sector and has been conducted every two years from 1991 
to 2006 by three major business associations (the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
(ACFIC), the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and the Chinese Academy 
of Social Science (SASS).4 The analysis in this paper is conducted using data pooled over 2004 
and 2006. There are 3,837 firms observed in 2006 survey and 3,012 firms in 2004 survey. 
These two years had consistent sets of questions whereas earlier surveys asked different questions. 
The dataset represents the largest and most comprehensive source of information on Chinese 
private enterprises. One of the database’s strengths is that the survey has a response rate of 
around 85%. 
The surveys sought information about enterprise owners, the nature of their firms, their 
management practices and the performance of their businesses. To ensure a focus on 
owner-managers, we first identify 5,384 non-listed firms where the largest owner is an 
individual. Then, we restrict the sample to the 3,413 firms in which the manager owns at least 
50% of the company. To minimize potential misreporting of the time allocation measures, 
we only include firms for which the total value for managing, studying and networking hours 
less than 16. This gives 3,074 observations. We then exclude firms for which the total 
number of hours spent on all three activities exceeded 24 as well as firms with zero work 
hours. This restricts our sample to 3,038 observations. Next we ensure that each respondent 
answered all relevant questions. This gives a final sample of 1,776 observations. The 
self-reported time allocation patterns of the owner-managers are used to develop a measure 
of time utilization. Owner-managers are asked to specify the number of hours they spend 
on average on the following activities per day: management, networking, and studying.  
Insert Table 1 
Table 1 presents variable definitions and summary statistics based on the estimation sample. 
On average, each day, entrepreneurs spend, 6.8 hours on management activities, 3.8 hours on 
networking activities and 1.6 hours to studying. Their total daily hours allocated to work 
(managing and networking) are 10.6 hours or 53 hours per week. This is slightly higher than 
worked by the CEOs of Italian companies who average around 48 hours over a 5 day-week 
(Bandiera et al. 2011). However, it is consistent with Hyytinen and Ruuskanen (2007) who 
report that the self-employed work more hours than those employed in organisations. The 
average age of Chinese entrepreneurs is 43 years old. Only 18.1% have university degree. The 
share of female entrepreneurs is quite low at 12.5%.The mean firm age is 5.6 years. Average 
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ownership share is 81.2%. 56.5% are defined as single decision-makers and 29% have 
previous management experience. Finally, private firms in our sample are profitable with an 
average 32.7% return on assets. Fung et al. (2007) use the same survey data in their study. 
They report that in wave 2000 and 2002, entrepreneurs’ average age is 44 years old; 90 
percent of them are male and more than a third have college degrees or higher. The average 
sales revenue in their sample is 21.6 million RMB (2.6 million USD) in 2002 and 18.7 million 
RMB (2.3 million USD) in 2000. The average firm age was six years in 2000 and seven years 
in 2002. The descriptive statistics in our sample are consistent with previous studies using the 
same survey data. 
Insert Table 2 
Table 2 presents correlation matrix for the firm-level variables employed in our analysis. The 
coefficients indicate no strong correlation among explanatory variables. The variance inflation 
factor (VIF) statistics are employed to test multicollinearity and suggest no evidence of 
multicollinearity in our empirical models.  
Insert Table 3 
Table 3 summarizes management, networking and study hours by ownership, management 
experience, gender, and size. As Panel A shows, we observe that managing and studying 
hours are not statistically different for firms with high (equal to or less than 75%) and those 
with a very high level (above 75%) of managerial ownership. However, lower stake owners 
are likely to spend more hours networking than higher stake owners. Panel B reports that, 
small business owners without management experience spend more (less) time on managing 
(networking) activities compared to their counterparts with management experience. Panel C 
shows that, relative to male entrepreneurs, on average female entrepreneurs spent significantly 
more hours on management activities but significantly fewer hours per day on networking. 
There are no differences between female and male entrepreneurs in relation to time spent on 
study. Finally, Panel D suggests that entrepreneurs managing larger firms spend more time on 
both networking and study hours than their counterparties running small businesses however 
there is no difference in the hours allocated to management activities.  
5. Results 
5.1 Whole sample 
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Insert Table 4 
Table 4 presents results using the Lewbel (2012) estimator with both internal and external 
instruments. Hours are measured as a share of 24 hours. We report the underidentification 
(Kleibergen-Paap LM) and overidentification (Hansen J) test results. For all three equations, 
the underidentification tests rejects the hypothesis that instruments are weak and that 
asymptotic theory provides a poor guide to actual finite-sample distributions. The 
overidentification tests do not reject the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid. We also 
perform the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test for the regressions and find no evidence of 
multicollinearity. F-tests reported in Table 4 reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are 
equal to zero. 
The results in Table 4 show support for Hypothesis 1. We find, as hypothesised, a statistically 
significant inverted U-shaped relationship between management hours and performance. 
Thus, up to a maximum of 6.8 hours, increasing the number of hours allocated for 
management hours increases profitability. However additional time, above 6.8 hours per day, 
spent on these activities reduces profitability. The 95% confidence interval ranges from 5.2 to 
8.4. There are two possible reasons behind the inverted U-shaped link. First, the labour-leisure 
model assumes diminishing marginal productivity of entrepreneurs. Second, motivation and 
aspiration could also be reduced with time spent on managing which in its turn increases 
opportunity costs. Despite these two facts, we find that 23.6% of owner managers spent in 
excess of 8.4 hours per day on management activities. The reallocation of time may have a 
positive effect on firm performance.  
The estimates for networking hours also reveal statistically significant inverted U-shaped 
relationship between time spent on increasing social capital and the return on assets of 
Chinese entrepreneurs. The finding supports Hypothesis 2 and is in line with Bosma et al. 
(2004) and Lee and Tsang (2001) who also argue that not only initial social capital, but also 
investment in social capital affects performance. However, the link between social capital and 
the return on assets is not monotonic. The maximum allocation is estimated to be 4.9 hours 
per day but beyond that, additional hours spent on networking harm performance. The 95% 
confidence interval ranges from 3.4 to 6.3 hours per day. Our data reveal that 60.4% of 
entrepreneurs spend time on networking outside this interval. Our results therefore suggest 
that the reallocation of time between activities will have a beneficial effect on performance.  
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In relation to Hypothesis 3, we find no evidence to support the hypothesis that there is an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between time spent studying and firm performance. This result 
is in line with Unger et al. (2011) who find that the outcomes of human capital investment 
(e.g. skills) are more important than human capital investment itself (e.g. time spent on 
study). More educated entrepreneurs may also be more risk averse which could affect 
decisions to invest or expand businesses (Davidsson and Honig, 2003). A further reason for 
the insignificant result is that the benefits of studying will take time to feed through to 
improved firm performance. Finally, some managers might misreport studying time as 
personal time or vice versa. Therefore, lack of statistical significance might simply reflect 
measurement error.5  
Among the control variables, both Log(Sales) and the dummy of single decision-making are 
statistically significant at 1% level. We find that performance is positively related to size 
which may be explained by economies of scale obtained by larger firms (Serrasqueiro and 
Nunes, 2008). In addition, larger size also allows for the possibility of a greater diversification 
of activities, enabling companies to cope more successfully with market changes, as well as 
with high-risk situations (Goddard et al. 2005). We find that previous management experience 
is not significant. The negative sign of the single decision-making dummy suggests that 
Chinese entrepreneurs, making decisions entirely by themselves, might make mistakes in the 
decision-making process that will have adverse effects on firm performance. Ownership is 
found to be positively related to performance, a finding consistent with the agency model 
discussed below.  
As set out in hypothesis H4, we develop the analysis by looking at a subsample that highlights 
potential agency issues and examine the effect of ownership stakes on the hours–performance 
relationship. We test the agency hypothesis that higher managerial ownership improves 
performance by splitting the sample into two groups, one consisting of firms in which the 
manager owner has between 50% and 75% of the shares and the other in which the manager 
owner has more than 75%. This allows us to distinguish between high and very high levels of 
ownership concentration and to evaluate the impact of ownership on the 
hours-worked-performance relationship. 
Insert Table 5 
As reported in Panel A of Table 5, we find no relationship between any of the hours variables 
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and performance for the 50-75% grouping. However, for the high ownership concentration 
group, ownership in excess of 75%, we find statistically significant inverted U-shaped 
relationships for management hours. The initial part of this result is consistent with Bitler et 
al. (2005) who find a positive relationship between entrepreneurs’ effort and firm 
performance when the level of managerial ownership is very high. However, the 
inverted-U-shaped nature of the result indicates that beyond a certain number of hours, 7.7 for 
the subsample with ownership in excess of 75%, performance suffers. This implies that even 
at high levels of ownership, there are limits to effectiveness of additional hours spent on work 
activities. Consistent with the agency theory, the results offer some support for Hypothesis 4 
and indicate that up to a point, for firms with very high managerial ownership, increasing 
management effort benefits firm performance.6  
 
The second sub-sample analyses the impact of managerial experience on the 
hours-performance relationship. We divide the sample into two groups, those that had 
previous managerial experience and those that did not. Entrepreneurs with different work 
experience are likely to develop different patterns of time allocation for different activities.  
 
As Panel B of Table 5 reports, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between 
management hours and performance for firms run by managers with previous managerial 
experience, with the optimal hours being 5.9. However, we find an insignificant relationship 
for networking and study hours. Our data also reveal an insignificant relationship between 
management hours and performance for firms run by managers without managerial 
experience. These results offer support for Hypothesis 5 given that the effort-performance 
relationship is present in the group that had previous managerial experience. This finding 
suggests that previously accumulated human and social capital complements managerial 
effort. We also observe that networking hours is significant for those without previous 
management experience. This may be because managers with no previous experience may 
have limited access to social networks and will therefore have to commit extra effort to build 
them up. However, too many hours allocated to networking can eventually adversely affect 
performance. 
 
Additional analysis and robustness checks 
Table 6 presents the results for two further subsamples. First, in relation to gender, it has been 
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shown that in transition economies, women entrepreneurs have been found to be 
disadvantaged in their access to male-dominated industry networks and in using the 
opportunities these networks present for business development and growth (Manolova 2005). 
In addition, legislation inherited in transitional economies may have harmed women’s future 
entrepreneurial success because the legislation reduced their chances of obtaining managerial 
experience (Bliss and Garratt 2001). Support for this comes from the fact that, as Table 1 
shows, women entrepreneurs account for only 12.5 percent of the sample. McKendrick and 
Carroll (2001) argue that the membership of business associations is an important networking 
forum for entrepreneurs. We find that significantly fewer Chinese women entrepreneurs have 
previous management experience or are members of business associations. Panel A shows a 
significant inverted U-shaped relationship between management hours and performance and 
between networking and firm performance is found for male entrepreneurs. However, no such 
relationship is found for female entrepreneurs. The results imply that the effort made by 
women entrepreneurs is not directly rewarded with better firm performance. No relationship 
between time spent studying and firm performance is found for either male or female 
entrepreneurs. 
 
Second, different patterns of time allocation by firm size were also reported in Table 3. Baker 
and Hall (2002) develop a model that allows CEO productivity differs for firms of different 
sizes and find that CEOs do a range of activities, the marginal product of which changes with 
size in varying degrees. In Table 6 Panel B, we split the sample by firm size and observe 
significant inverted U-shaped relationship between management hours and performance in 
smaller sized firms. This may be due to that small firms have distinct advantages in judging 
and estimating workers’, as well as managers’ performance (Zenger 1994). In contrast, the 
effort-performance relationship is insignificant for larger firms. This may be because it is 
more difficult to measure the direct link between owner-managers’ effort and firm 
performance as firm size increases.  
Insert Table 6 
We have also undertaken four additional analyses to check the validity of our main results.7 
First, we employ different measures of performance as dependent variables, including return 
to sales (ROS) calculated by the ratio of net income to total sales; production efficiency 
calculated by output per worker; and innovation measured by the ratio of R&D to equity plus 
debt. Overall, the estimates are in line with those reported in Table 4. Positive impacts on firm 
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performance and diminishing marginal effects are found on both management and networking 
hours when firm performance is measured by ROS. The statistically significant inverted 
U-shaped relationship between management hours and firm performance is also found with 
output per worker used as dependent variable. However, we find no significant effects when 
innovation is used as the dependent variable. This may be due to the effects of time lags, 
which we are unable to address due to data availability. 
Secondly, we add additional explanatory variables in the regressions, including a financial 
constraint (Bank loans/Assets); an innovation dummy (equals to 1, if the firm has patent); and 
a foreign investment dummy (equals to 1, if the firm makes investment overseas) (Du and 
Girma 2012; Liu 2012). The findings remain consistent with the results reported in Table 4.  
The third robustness check is related to the functional form of the time allocation and 
performance relationship. Bandiera et al. (2011), report a logarithmic relationship between 
hours and performance. We adapt our econometric specification (1) by replacing Hours and 
Hours2 with the natural logarithm of Hours. To control for potential endogeneity we employ 
the Lewbel (2012) estimator with both internal and external instruments, as used in the main 
analysis. The results show a positive and statistically significant relationship for management 
hours but insignificant result for networking. Study hours are also insignificant. Thus, the 
quadratic relationship seems to be more appropriate than the logarithmic alternative.  
Fourth, the entrepreneurs who allocate more time in studying may indicate stronger 
commitment to achieve high performance of their businesses; therefore we did a robustness 
check by treating education as an endogenous variable. As in Table 4, the results show an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between management hours and firm performance and 
between networking and firm performance.  
6. Conclusions 
This study examines the effect of time allocation on performance for 1,776 Chinese 
owner-manager firms in 2004 and 2006. We investigate a question which is fundamental to 
the success of small business owners, namely: what is the best way to allocate the scarce 
resource of time? We answer this question by analyzing how financial performance is affected 
by the allocation of time between different activities. As hypothesised, we find a statistically 
significant inverted U-shaped relationship between management hours and firm performance 
and between networking hours and firm performance. However, we report no relationship 
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between study hours and firm performance. The optimal time allocation for management 
activities is 6.8 hours per day and the optimal networking time allocation is 4.9 hours per day.  
We also analyse the time allocation-performance relationship in relation to agency issues, to 
previous management experience, firm size and to gender. We find no relationship between 
management hours and performance for firms with 50%-75% management ownership but a 
significant quadratic relationship for higher ownership stakes is observed. This indicates that 
there are agency issues in private companies and that the agency conflict is reduced as 
ownership increases. We also find that management experience produces an inverted 
U-shaped relationship for those firms whose managers had previous managerial experience. 
Similar results are found for small firm subsample. In addition, we examine different effects 
of men and women entrepreneurs’ time allocation on firm performance. Significant inverted 
U-shaped relationship between management hours and performance and between networking 
and firm performance are found for men entrepreneurs; but not for women entrepreneurs. 
The analysis has presented new insights into the effects of time allocation of owner-managers 
on the financial performance of firms in China, an economy that is in the process of adopting 
a more market-oriented economic system. A number of policy implications can be derived 
from our results. First, although a work ethic is important, the results offer little justification 
for working long hours because it does not necessarily improve the financial performance of 
companies. This result is particularly interesting given that 23.6% of business owners in our 
data spend more than 8.4 hours per day on management activities. An awareness of the 
importance of time allocation is important for those starting their own business and policy 
makers should try to ensure that entrepreneurs know this. Second, while networking hours are 
important, our results suggest that there are limits to the effectiveness of time spent on this 
activity. The optimal level of networking is estimated to be 4.9 hours per day but 26.2% of 
business owners network more than five hours and 26% less than three hours. These figures 
suggest that firms will improve performance if managers reallocate their time more 
effectively. Third, the failure rate of entrepreneurial firms is high and thus policy makers 
should provide information and assistance in relation to the most efficient use of time. Our 
results show that working long hours does not necessarily improve performance, a finding 
which is important for entrepreneurs. 
We find evidence that the allocation of time across different activities significantly affects 
performance. The results offer support for the increasing opportunity cost model which argues 
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that performance and effort will be positively related up to a certain number of hours and that 
beyond that point, the relationship will become negative. Investment in social capital also 
positively affects performance but too many hours spend on that activity will produce 
negative returns. However, our analysis of the impact of human capital factors produced 
insignificant results. This may be explained by the fact that the data did not enable an 
inter-temporal analysis to be undertaken and that increases in human capital has no short run 
impact on performance.  
The analysis does have a number of limitations. First, the use of survey data which relies on 
self-reporting of hours raises the problem of accuracy and recall bias. Therefore further 
in-depth analysis of case studies may offer additional insights. Second, the structure of the 
survey does not permit the use of panel data techniques, which would provide a richer 
analysis of the effort-performance relationship. Third, while providing rich source for 
research exploration, a number of important variables for example ownership concentration or 
industry-specific human capital are not present in our data which could indicate omitted 
variables bias. 
The study offers a number of directions for further research. First, further studies could be 
undertaken to construct a database of the relationship over time. This would enable the 
analysis to address issues such as the reaction of activity hours to poor, or good performance. 
Lagged effects could also be analysed. Furthermore, the effect of studying hours on 
performance might only be observed in the long run. Second, an interesting extension of our 
work could involve exploring the effectiveness of the way in which time is allocated. It might 
be a case, that working less but more efficiently has much greater effect on performance than 
working more hours but being less efficient. This would offer potential insights into the need 
for an effective work-life balance. Third, the analysis relates to China and it would be 
instructive to see how far the relationships extend to other emerging economies. Fourth, an 
assessment of entrepreneurial motivation might offer additional insights into the allocation of 
time-performance relationship. 
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Endnotes 
1Glaeser et al. (2002) argue that people who investment in human capital are also likely to invest in 
social capital. 
2The results for levels of hours are available on request. 
3In addition to the logarithm of total sales we have also experimented with the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees. The results are quantitatively similar to those reported in this work. 
4 See also Fung et al. (2007) for a description of the same dataset. 
5 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
6 Ownership concentration could be another important characteristic to control for. Unfortunately, our 
data source does not report any plausible proxies for this factor. 
7The estimates are available upon request. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for estimation sample.  
 
 Mean s.d. Median 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Main Variables    
Return on assets 0.327 0.514 0.165 
Management hours per day 6.816 2.365 7.000 
Management hours per day divided by 24 0.284 0.099 0.292 
Networking hours per day 3.847 1.928 4.000 
Networking hours per day divided by 24 0.160 0.080 0.167 
Study hours per day 1.559 0.900 1.000 
Study hours per day divided by 24 0.065 0.038 0.042 
Log(Age) 3.769 0.176 3.761 
Log(Firm Age) 1.735 0.713 1.792 
Log(Sales) 6.272 1.952 6.234 
Management Experience 0.290 0. 454 0.000 
Single-decision making 0.565 0. 496 1.000 
Education 0.181 0.385 0.000 
Female 0.125 0.331 0.000 
Share of ownership 0.812 0.170 0.800 
    
Instrumental Variables    
Log(Household expenditure) 1.833 0.819 1.792 
Log(Management team size) 1.919 1.193 1.792 
Log(Number of family members) 1.229 0.440 1.099 
Personal income divided by household income 0.720 0.221 0.714 
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Table 2: Correlation matrix. 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
ROA 1 1            
Management 
hours 
2 0.002 1          
 
Networking 
hours 
3 -0.063*** -0.438*** 1         
 
Study hours 4 0.001 -0.099*** -0.017 1         
Log(Age) 5 0.026 0.132*** -0.059*** 0.037* 1        
Log(FirmAge) 6 0.018 0.056*** -0.013 0.065*** 0.257*** 1       
Log(Sales) 7 0.066*** -0.002 0.113*** 0.101*** 0.125*** 0.281*** 1      
Management 
Experience 
8 -0.001 -0.039** 0.071*** 0.054*** 0.171*** 0.021 0.128*** 1    
 
Single- 
decision 
making 
9 -0.062*** -0.062*** 0.097*** 0.13*** -0.039* 0.007 0.29*** 0.05** 1   
 
Education 10 -0.052** -0.064*** 0.067*** 0.113*** -0.088*** -0.036* 0.135*** 0.058*** 0.174*** 1   
Female 11 0.017 0.061*** -0.099*** -0.014 -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.135*** -0.063*** -0.015 -0.001 1  
Ownership 12 0.066*** 0.038* -0.058*** -0.003 0.016 0.098*** -0.169*** -0.047** -0.299*** -0.092 0.07*** 1 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Hour Variables by Ownership, Management Experience, 
Gender and Size. 
Panel A: By ownership 
 50% <ownership ≤ 75% 75% < ownership  
 mean s.d. N mean s.d. N Mean 
Difference 
Management hours 6.726 0.076 977 6.871 0.059 1,608 -0.145 
Networking hours 3.978 0.067 885 3.767 0.049 1,456 0.211** 
Study hours 1.578 0.025 977 1.614 0.021 1,608 -0.036 
 
Panel B: By management experience 
 With management 
experience 
Without management 
experience 
 
 mean s.d. N mean s.d. N Mean 
Difference 
Management hours 6.672 0.087 750 6.875 0.055 1,835 -0.203** 
Networking hours 4.058 0.073 692 3.758 0 .047 1,649 0.3*** 
Study hours 1.619 0.029 750 1.593 0.019 1,835 0.025 
 
Panel C: By gender 
 Male Entrepreneurs Female Entrepreneurs  
 mean s.d. N mean s.d. N Mean 
Difference 
Management hours 6.834 0.06 1,570 7.168 0.153 211 -0.334** 
Networking hours 3.951 0.051 1,306 3.332 0.138 170 0.619*** 
Study hours 1.524 0.022 1,413 1.57 0.07 211 -0.046 
 
Panel D: By size 
 Log(Sales) above median Log(Sales) below median  
 mean s.d. N mean s.d. N Mean 
Difference 
Management hours 6.877 0.076 890 6.87 0.081 886 0.007 
Networking hours 4.055 0.067 853 3.686 0.069 774 0.369*** 
Study hours 1.626 0.029 862 1.428 0.03 815 0.198*** 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate t-test significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
32 
 
   
Table 4: Results for instrumental variables regressions for firm performance and activity 
hours.  
 Management Networking Study 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Hours (share) 
3.689* 
(2.056) 
1.911* 
(1.009)   
0.278 
(2.015) 
Hours2 (share) 
-6.508* 
(3.768) 
-4.723** 
(2.175)  
-1.292 
(7.145) 
Log(Age) 
-0.02 
(0.077) 
-0.029 
(0.078) 
-0.027 
(0.073) 
Log(Firm Age) 
-0.034* 
(0.019) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.028 
(0.02) 
Log(Sales) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
0.027*** 
(0.007) 
0.026*** 
(0.007) 
Management Experience 
-0.013 
(0.028) 
-0.007 
(0.026) 
-0.01 
(0.027) 
Single-decision making 
-0.072*** 
(0.024) 
-0.078*** 
(0.026) 
-0.085*** 
(0.029) 
Ownership 
0.174** 
(0.071) 
0.1 
(0.072) 
0.131* 
(0.072) 
Education 
-0.079*** 
(0.027) 
-0.087*** 
(0.026) 
-0.062** 
(0.03) 
Female 
0.07** 
(0.036) 
0.079** 
(0.037) 
0.05 
(0.035) 
N. Obs. 1,776 1,627 1,677 
R2 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Under-identification test 63.159*** 87.079*** 53.892*** 
Over-identification test 25.899 28.693 25.992 
Optimal Hours 6.802 4.856 2.584 
Optimal Hours 95% CI [5.218, 8.385] [3.371, 6.341] [-9.683, 14.851] 
Mean VIF 5.57 3.1 2.26 
F-test 4.17*** 4.16*** 3.55*** 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Dependent 
variable is ROA. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Industry, region and time 
dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Instrument set includes internally 
generated instruments and external instruments (the logarithm of household expenditure, the 
natural logarithm of entrepreneur's family size, and the share of personal income in total 
household income.) Optimal Hours is the level of activity hours that maximizes performance. 
Optimal Hours 95% CI is the 95% confidence interval for optimal activity hours. 
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Table 5: Results for instrumental variables regressions for firm performance and activity 
hours for subsamples. 
 
Panel A: By ownership 
Subsample 50% <ownership ≤ 75%       ownership > 75% 
 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Hours (share) 
0.423 
(3.227) 
-1.004 
(1.14) 
0.787 
(2.713) 
5.563** 
(2.742) 
1.357 
(1.101) 
-0.628 
(1.907) 
Hours2(share) 
-2.623 
(5.583) 
0.939 
(2.322) 
-4.12 
(8.656) 
-8.684* 
(4.874) 
-3.811 
(2.645) 
0.994 
(6.367) 
N. Obs. 863 783 780 1,103 1,012 1,035 
R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
Panel B: By management experience 
Subsample With management experience Without management experience 
 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Hours (share) 
6.784** 
(2.836) 
0.475 
(1.932) 
-2.086 
(2.619) 
0.869 
(2.554) 
2.635* 
(1.235) 
0.467 
(3.723) 
Hours2(share) 
-13.896** 
(5.759) 
-2.336 
(4.124) 
6.557 
(8.406) 
-0.17 
(4.855) 
-5.693* 
(2.584) 
-1.101 
(14.442) 
N. Obs. 529 492 512 1,116 1,024 1,043 
R2 0.08 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Dependent 
variable is ROA. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Industry, region and time 
dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Instrument set includes internally 
generated instruments and external instruments (the logarithm of household expenditure, the 
natural logarithm of entrepreneur's family size, the natural logarithm of firm’s management 
team size and the share of personal income in total household income.)  
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Table 6: Additional analyses for firm performance and activity hours 
 
Panel A: By gender 
Subsample Male Entrepreneurs Female Entrepreneurs 
 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Hours (share) 
4.147** 
(2.044) 
3.166*** 
(1.049) 
3.907 
(4.589) 
1.024 
(2.79) 
0.276 
(1.635) 
-5.587 
(4.209) 
Hours2(share) 
-8.22** 
(3.948) 
-7.722*** 
(2.281) 
-24.973 
(33.679) 
7.655 
(7.627) 
-1.107 
(4.214) 
37.285 
(34.577) 
N. Obs. 1,570 1,306 1,413 186 170 211 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.19 0.04 0.01 
 
Panel B: By size 
Subsample Log(Sales) below median Log(Sales) above median 
 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Management 
(1) 
Networking 
(2) 
Study 
(3) 
Hours (share) 
4.879** 
(2.268) 
0.31 
(1.164) 
0.783 
(3.11) 
2.054 
(3.556) 
0.696 
(1.329) 
4.158 
(5.596) 
Hours2(share) 
-8.686** 
(3.931) 
-0.497 
(2.801) 
-19.794 
(25.391) 
-5.757 
(6.948) 
-2.516 
(2.646) 
-34.941 
(38.85) 
N. Obs. 739 777 890 917 874 917 
R2 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 
 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Dependent 
variable is ROA. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Industry, region and time 
dummies are included in all specifications but not reported. Instrument set includes internally 
generated instruments and external instruments (the logarithm of household expenditure, the 
natural logarithm of entrepreneur's family size, the natural logarithm of firm’s management 
team size and the share of personal income in total household income.)  
 
